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ABSTRACT:  This article focuses on the trending issues about vertical integration between 
payment systems and the electronic commerce platforms from a Brazilian perspective. It 
describes the increasing international electronic commerce and it indicates three kinds of  
potential risks to consumers: direct, indirect and social. It shows that vertical 
integration can bring some benefits, which are very difficult to measure due to 
the related risks. The article creates a model of  the remote commerce based on an evolution of  a 
typology of  typical trade relations to shed some light over the current automatization. Afterwards, 
the article states that the leakage of  personal information coupled with vertical integration is a 
major threat to electronic businesses. It describes two international cases of  mass data leakage 
to demonstrate the difficulties faced by the national systems in regulating transnational electronic 
commerce and data protection. Then, the article performs an assessment of  the Brazilian legal 
system to conclude that there is a grave lack of  integration of  the electronic commerce regulations 
and that there is an absence of  international cooperation provisions designed for electronic com-
merce. It concludes that Brazilian law may benefit from international experiences of  personal 
data protection, and that the new legal provisions must take in account the risks associated with 
internationalization and vertical integration.
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I. Introduction1
Money exchange through electronic payment systems is an important engine 
for commercial relations between citizens and enterprises in the contemporary 
world.2 The Internet has enabled e-commerce operations ranging from big retail 
electronic stores – e.g. Amazon –, to small suppliers, even clustered in collective 
vending systems – e.g. ETSY. However, the payments of  these commercial relations 
almost exclusively take place through inter-banking systems and, in particular, via the 
use of  a credit card. New electronic partners have appeared such as PayPal and Pag-
Seguro UOL in Brazil, notwithstanding that both still base their systems on credit 
cards. Recently, the use of  electronic currencies has grown stronger, such as Bitcoin.3 
The central subject of  this article is the understanding of  the legal framework 
applicable to e-commerce in light of  integration of  purchase and sale systems and 
the means of  payment. To discuss the Brazilian legal framework, it will be necessary 
to address the issue of  bank data security and personal data protection. This issue 
is of  special importance when we think about the risks posed to users by a possible 
integration between e-commerce suppliers and payment systems. Therefore, we could 
not separate the issue of  the risks in commercial relations from the debate about 
contracts as we can see in the discussions that happen in the international forums 
dedicated to create transnational legal standards that apply directly to Internet trade.4 
Thus, technological development has made contractual formation occur more and 
more remotely and incrementally without direct intervention of  concerned parts, as 
Bruno Deffains and Jane K. Winn expose it. The Authors explain that, in the 1980s, 
exchange systems began to operate in real time and “unlike telex or fax technology, it 
became possible for the first time to form contracts with nothing more than machine-to-machine 
communications”.5 The problem has become clear since the regulatory concerns did 
not immediately follow the technological advances. Those concerns only became 
clear upon the next decade – the 1990s – and they have grown into a draft model-law 
as the one created by UNCITRAL (United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law) especially for e-commerce. 
1 The article develops ideas presented at the International Seminar on the “Effectiveness of  Law in 
Light of  the Internet Giants’ Power” organized by the University of  Brasília (UnB), the Fluminense 
Federal University (UFF), the Paris Descartes University (Paris 5), the University of  Paris 1 – Panthéon 
Sorbonne and the University of  Versailles Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines from April 13 to 15, 2016. The 
Authors are especially grateful to Professor Dominique Legeais from Paris Descartes University (Paris 
5) for the debate that was crucial to this final version of  the article. The Authors are also thankful 
to the Brasilia Federal District Research Support Foundation (FAPDF), to the Brazilian Foundation 
for the Coordination of  the Superior Education Personnel (CAPES) and to the French Embassy in 
Brazil.
2  Eric Brousseau, “Commerce électronique: ce que disent les chiffres et ce qu’il faudrait savoir”, Economie et 
statistique 339-340 (2000): 147-70.
3 Jonathan B. Turpin, “Bitcoin: the economic case for a global, virtual currency operating in 
an unexplored legal framework”, Indiana Journal of  Global Legal Studies 21 (2014): 355-68. Reuben 
Grinberg, “Bitcoin: an innovative alternative digital currency”, Hastings Science & Technology Law Journal 
4 (2012): 159-208.
4 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, “Developing electronic commerce 
legislation”, acessed May 17, 2018, http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DTL/STI_and_ICTs/ICT4D-
Legislation.aspx.
5 Bruno Deffains and Jane K. Winn, “The effect of  electronic commerce technologies on business 
contracting behaviors”, in Governance, regulations and powers on the Internet, ed. Eric Brousseau et al. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 345.
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After that initial time, the doubts began to spread and the debate evolved 
to solutions that tried to mesh legal uncertainty problems – the former focused 
on the debate about electronic contracts – and technical security ones, the latter 
related to cryptography and information systems. We can describe the contemporary 
international panorama by the radicalization of  two facts. The first fact is the rapid 
increase of  supplier chains whose operation is completely automatic and electronic. 
That fact has a huge impact on the expansion of  B2B (business to business) 
e-commerce relations. The second fact is the expansion of  the direct e-commerce 
among the small suppliers model business; the B2C (business to consumers) became 
widespread. However, there is a tendency that such small B2C use big market 
companies – e.g. Amazon or e-Bay – as intermediaries or brokers. Therefore, the 
market experiences a tendency towards concentration in a few Internet giants. 
Nevertheless, there is still some space for some C2C (consumer-to-consumer) 
commerce. Nonetheless, the consumer’s dependence on the broker big platforms 
puts some doubts over some optimist visions of  a potential downstream market 
(horizontal). 
At the core of  this process is the vertical integration of  electronic payment 
methods with e-commerce tools. Vertical integration possesses some advantages in 
terms of  costs, security and reliability related to the gains of  scale provided by the 
big companies’ investment power. Thus, at the beginning, an Internet platform that 
carries out more e-commerce transactions could invest more in security systems 
because of  its greater profit margin. A large brokerage firm could also offer lower 
prices to its users, since the gains of  scale would potentially lower its costs. Actually, 
the vertical integration of  e-commerce and payment could bring some potential 
advantages directly to the suppliers and indirectly to the consumers. In terms of  
companies’ advantages, they could lower their operation costs, since they would 
spend less money on brokerage services such as credit card operators and other 
electronic payment solutions. The users could enjoy some indirect advantages either 
by experiencing faster transactions or by perceiving the reduction of  costs and risks.
However, there are never potential advantages without some risks. The first 
ensemble of  risks go straight to the users. It resides in personal and bank information 
leaks. In this paper, the description of  two international large-scale leak cases 
highlight the risk of  keeping personal and banking information on storage systems 
from service and product providers. In the leak cases committed by frauds against 
companies, the harm to the users is direct. However, it is somewhat difficult to 
prove the guilt of  the companies, which are victims of  the fraudster’s actions after 
all. The second ensemble of  risks is indirectly assigned to users. It is the threat 
of  potential improper use of  their banking and personal information by Internet 
intermediaries, providers, e-commerce brokers or electronic payment systems. The 
users’ bank information – together with the information about the purchases made 
by them – can serve as an element to increase the companies’ profit when they use 
them in targeted marketing operations, for example. The third and last ensemble of  
risks goes on society. It refers to the threat that new integrated purchase systems can 
offer to national banking systems and the potential offenses against competition law.
To explore those three ensembles of  risks, the first part of  the article analyses 
the cryptography and Internet privacy issues to underline the technological and legal 
challenges faced when establishing security measures on social and economic relations 
via networks operated with open protocols and with wide interconnection. The 
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first part of  the paper concludes that social trust is the key element to guarantee the 
proper functioning of  commercial relations and that this subject needs much more 
legal awareness. The second part of  the article analyses two international cases of  
banking data leaks and draws a speculative parallel with the new scenario of  privacy 
and cryptography issues on the Internet after the Edward Snowden case of  2013.6 
The last part of  the article focuses on Brazilian law, highlighting the current 
legislation and its applicability to personal and banking data leak situations. The 
analysis of  Brazilian law leads to two main conclusions. The first conclusion relates 
to the national jurisdictional limits to achieve standards of  protection against fraud 
and damages when dealing with global commercial relations. It points the lack of  
success of  the current legal Brazilian framework especially when compared to the 
European Union model based on the Directive 2000/31/EC (electronic commerce) 
and on the Directive 95/46/EC (personal data protection). The General Data 
Protection Regulation (Regulation 2016/679/EU) has recently replaced the former 
Directive on personal data protection. The second conclusion focuses the necessary 
utilization of  the judicial cooperation systems as a means to the end of  strengthening 
the international commerce – and foreign users. The judicial cooperation will be a 
global necessity in order to develop a more reliable regulatory system to grant secure 
commercial relations.
II. Privacy, cryptography and social trust
The subject of  retention of  banking and credit data by intermediaries is central 
to contemporary e-commerce development. That topic directly connects to encryption 
and its uses in commercial trade through the Internet. It is clear that cryptographic 
systems are at the core of  the security of  the exchange information debate, especially 
after the social trust problem that emerged with the Edward Snowden case (2013)7 
and the recent Cambridge Analytica case (2017-2018). In this section, we will initially 
discuss the evolution of  the trade systems in general to demonstrate that the operation 
of  modern commerce has always relied on brokers and intermediaries. After that 
description, we will reach the current point in which it will be possible to understand the 
difficulty in establishing a reliable brokerage mode applicable to the new e-commerce 
systems. It is usual to state the solution to the problem and risks in electronic commerce 
with advanced cryptography.8 Unfortunately, the possibility of  third parties collecting 
and analysing a massive amount of  data somewhat increases the fear of  frauds and 
potential illegal practices on Internet. Both the Edward Snowden revelations and the 
Cambridge Analytica case pose a new questions agenda.9
The national and international banking systems have their own rules regarding 
security of  transactions made between them and their clients as well, and between 
their clearing and remittance systems. It is easy to notice that several national 
banking systems have invested a lot in encryption systems to increase the confidence 
6 Bernard Benhamou, “La gouvernance de l’internet après Snowden”, Revue Politique Étrangère 79 
(2014): 14-30.
7 Regina Connolly, “Trust in commercial and personal transactions in the digital age”, in The Oxford handbook 
of  Internet studies, ed. William H. Dutton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014): 262-82.
8 Ramnath K. Chellappa and Paul A. Pavlou, “Perceived information security, financial liability and consumer 
trust in electronic commerce transactions”, Logistics Information Management 15 (2002): 358-68. Pauline 
Ratnasingham, “The importance of  trust in electronic commerce”, Internet Research 8 (1998): 313-21.
9 Markus Jakobsson, ed., The death of  the Internet (New Jersey: John Willey & Sons, 2012).
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level on clients’ transactions as indicated by Marc Lacoursière and Édith Vézina 
on the Canadian situation.10 In 2007, the Authors mentioned that there was a need 
for greater legal regulation of  the Quebec’s trade systems to provide security to 
consumers regarding local banks. They pointed, in particular, to the fragility of  
the Canadian provincial legal system in comparison to the international ones on 
the aspect of  granting more security to local banking users in order to enhance 
their sense of  confidence. They conclude that, in 2007, the Canadian banking 
sector would have less interest in such development. To face their hypothesis, the 
Authors emphasized that the clearing international systems (BIC/SWIFT), which 
operate as a worldwide bank and a banking relations register11, were using public key 
cryptography methods with great success and that this system should be widely used 
in Canada. In the Brazilian case, the solution came from the same technical path. The 
Brazilian National Institute of  Information Technology (ITI) manages the National 
Public Key Infrastructure (ICP-Brazil). This system has been a suitable tool used 
in the Brazilian financial and banking sector, which has invested many resources in 
computerizing its communication systems over the years.12
However, if  this article’s exposition continued towards banking systems, it would 
divert from its original subject since our focus is not the analysis of  the Brazilian 
banking systems or any other financial operators in their usual functions. The main 
point of  this paper is to ponder about the existence of  risks to consumers banking 
– and credit card – data managed by third parties (merchants or electronic systems) 
in the context of  commercial operations. The abstract model presented in this paper 
aims to highlight the importance of  the broker role on commercial transactions and 
to understand the current paradigm in which e-commerce innovations emphasize 
the three ensembles of  risks mentioned at the introduction – direct, indirect and 
social risks. This model considers three basic abstract types of  remote consumer 
transactions, which show the complexity of  contemporary business practices.
The first type of  remote shopping is the old system based on catalogs in which 
the customer places the order via traditional mail or telephone. In that type, catalogs 
offer products and services in lists. The customer can order and pay with various 
methods. The consumer accessed the product catalog and purchased them by 
means of  postal (or bank) check or even by means of  a previous bank deposit. In a 
remote past, the purchase of  foreign books in Brazil has taken place in this way. The 
consumer contacted directly a bookseller or a publisher from another city or country 
and ordered the desired book. Another way was to search for a bookseller that had 
several catalogs and served as a trusted broker usually charging for this service.
This first type of  remote shopping evolved into a second one in which 
consumers accessed information from physical or online catalogs. Suppliers were 
no longer contacted via physical stores, mediate systems or via traditional payment 
systems. As the relation begin to take place directly, it became necessary to use 
different means of  payment. In the previous type, there was no retention of  any 
10 Marc Lacoursière and Édith Vézina, “La sécurité des opérations bancaires par Internet”, Revue Juridique 
Thémis 41 (2007): 89-156.
11 Susan V. Scott and Markos Zachariadis, The Society for Worldwide Interbank Telecommunication (SWIFT): 
cooperative governance for network innovation, standards and community (London: Routledge, 2014). Susan V. 
Scott and Markos Zachariadis, “Origins and development of  SWIFT, 1973–2009”, Business History 
54 (2012): 462-82.
12 Alberto Luiz Albertin, “Comércio eletrônico: um estudo no setor bancário”, Revista de Administração 
Contemporânea 3 (1999): 47-70.
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client banking data by the supplier. However, in the new model, the supplier receives 
credit card data to carry out the transaction. In an initial moment, there were not 
even electronic machines for credit cards billing. Card numbers were copied into the 
commercial transaction invoice. Yet, there was trust that the supplier would not use 
again the card numbers for another purchase. This system evolved. At first, it uses 
telephone, or facsimile or traditional mail means. Afterwards, the electronic mail was 
the mean of  communication of  the credit card numbers. It was a past phase to the 
current moment with electronic purchases in automated systems.
The contemporary systems differ from the previous for a simple reason: it 
has become an entirely automated and digital system. All types, however, use the 
same logic, which still prevails: the existence of  a consumer and a supplier sharing 
trust to effect a monetary exchange involving the commercial relation. Noteworthy, 
that old systems have become digital. Therefore, the security issues have gained a 
complex dimension due to two elements. First, suppliers have some database to hold 
the banking information stock. The second element relates to the intrinsic risks of  
t Internet data transmissions. Both elements merge into an increasing possibility of  
damage occurrence and mostly they mesh into the additional difficulty in holding one 
of  concerned parts accountable for eventual frauds or violations. The table below 
summarizes all three models in an abstract appreciation of  their potential risks.
Figure 1. Abstract models of  indirect customer relationship
Means of  
information
Business 
relationship 
mode
Monetary 
exchange 
system
Information 
storage by 
supplier
Assessment of  
risks to users / 
consumers
Indirect 
physical 
catalog
In person 
with third-
party
Payment in 
person No
Low risk, because the 
buyer performs the 
operation in person
Direct 
physical 
catalog
Letter or 
telephone
Check or 
bank deposit No
Low risk, because the 
operation consumes 
the means (check, 
e.g.) during the 
transaction
Direct 
physical 
catalog
Letter or 
telephone
Credit card 
data Maybe
High risk, because the 
merchant can retain 
the consumers data
Catalog in 
website
Email, after a 
website access
Credit card 
data Maybe
High risk, because 
merchant can retain 
the consumers data
Website 
access Bank transfer No
Moderate risk, 
because operation 
goes the through the 
bank system, but can 
a third party may 
illegally access it
Catalog by 
cell phone 
terminal
Mobile app Credit card data Maybe
High risk, because 
merchant can retain 
the consumers data
What is important to retain from all abstract types indicated above is the 
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existence of  two main factors that never change in the evolution of  the remote 
purchases system. The first factor is the existence of  a transaction system managed 
by a third party, either a bank or a credit card operator, to accomplish the commercial 
relation. The second factor is the possibility of  data retention by third parties during 
the billing moment. A simplification is indicated in the figure below.
Figure 2. Brokerage abstract models
Broker
Consumer
Bank - cash
Bank - check
Bank - transfer
Card - personal use
Card - indirect and 
physical
Card - indirect and remote
Supplier
To summarise, there is always an intermediary or broker between the consumer 
(purchaser) and the supplier in modern purchasing relations. Thus, even in commercial 
transactions paid in cash, the national monetary system serves as a broker. After all, 
bills (banknotes) are legal commitments that some money will be paid. What is the 
liability for using a fake bill (banknote) to conduct a transaction? In case one of  the 
parties has knowledge, of  course, the responsibility for using fake bills (banknotes) 
relies on the one acting with the absence of  good faith in the transaction. However, 
using fake bills (banknotes) with a devious intent is sometimes hard to prove. In 
that case, who will be liable? Will it be the consumer purchaser or the supplier? The 
blame usually falls on who owns and uses the disreputable mean. A large part of  the 
problem merges intrinsically meshed with the confidence and the trust that both 
parties have with the intermediary or broker. The liability of  the broker is crucial to 
the legal debate on this matter because this is central to the wellness of  the contracts’ 
resolution.
Nevertheless, we need to see contemporary issues that demonstrate the risks’ 
perception and how they relate with confidence and trust. The first is the possibility 
of  the consumer’s data retention in supplier databases, which has become especially 
true due to the widespread credit cards usage. The second is the future emergence of  
more-than-integrated purchase systems: the use of  monetary transactions systems, 
in which the suppliers are also users and owners of  a once third-party system. In 
other words, it is the potential development of  integrated purchase systems in which 
the supplier is also the controller of  the monetary transaction system.13 Therefore, 
that integration between the suppliers and purchase systems change the scales of  
the distribution of  liabilities because the merged system will also absorb both kind 
of  rights and duties. If  the supplier keeps the users’ bank and personal data, it could 
share some degree of  liability for some eventual damages. However, if  the enterprises 
controls both the systems, their liability will considerably grow.  To examine those two 
13 Thierry Dissaux, “Paiements, monnaie, banque électroniques: quelle évolution pour la banque?”, Revue 
d’économie financière 53 (1999): 113-32.
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issues, as well as supplier systems rights and duties, we will describe two international 
data leakage cases. Notwithstanding, it will be important to mention a little about 
cryptography before. The cryptographic systems are the daily technological means 
to grant the security of  transactions in order to increase user and consumer trust.
In a previous paper about the organization of  the Brazilian national digital 
certification system, Christiana Freitas and Alexandre Veronese have already argued 
that cryptography has a subtle issue within itself: citizens’ right to keep secrets from 
the State, other citizens or enterprises. In addition, the paper dealt with the State’s 
right to access to some person’s information and, thus, ensure social, economic 
and legal relations security.14 In a simplified form, the kind of  cryptography that 
has relevance to the contemporary debate is based on digital certification systems 
whereby, apart from compelling a huge computational capacity use for unauthorized 
content decoding, it is possible to authenticate the messages sender and receiver. 
The systems both encrypt data and authenticate the end-line users. For this purpose, 
such systems use asymmetric cryptographic algorithms in public key systems. The 
technical process uses also provide the inviolability guarantee by authorized third 
parties – public-key infrastructures (PKI) – being subject to constant audit in their 
operations. In Brazil’s case, the National Institute of  Information Technology (ITI) 
manages the ICP-Brazil system. The ITI is an agency within the Chief  of  Staff  
Office of  the Brazilian Presidency of  the Republic. The Brazilian digital certificate 
system grants and audits the operation of  several technical subsystems used by the 
Brazilian banking system, for example. Therefore, the Brazilian national banking 
transactions use this system. However, what about international transactions? To 
reflect on that issue, the next section of  this article will approach two well-known 
international cases of  leakage of  banking data held by electronic service providers. 
III. Two banking data leak cases with transnational impacts
Due to online purchases and banking transactions via Internet, as well as to the 
existence of  weaknesses in stored information security mechanisms, the occurrence 
of  personal data leak cases has intensified all around the world. Given the high number 
of  individuals affected in different countries and due to their legal repercussions, it 
is relevant to describe two emblematic cases. The first case was the personal data 
leakage from the PlayStation Network, in 2011, which reached around 77 million 
users’ accounts.15 The PlayStation Network is an online gaming service accessed via 
Internet from several countries in which it is possible to purchase and to download 
games and other types of  apps and media. In addition, this service allows game play 
within other network associates. Sony Corporation owns the PlayStation network 
and also develops and manufactures the videogame consoles for it. In addition, in 
its current generation – PlayStation 4 –, it is imperative to have a network account 
to play online matches. Many Internet services are going through the same path. 
Microsoft and Apple are demanding accounts and it is sometimes mandatory that 
the users provide their credit card information.
According to Sony’s official statement, between April 17th and 19th, 2011, a 
14 Christiana Freitas and Alexandre Veronese, “Segredo e democracia: certificação digital e software 
livre”, Informática Pública 8 (2007): 9-26.
15 “Sony PlayStation suffers massive data breach”, Reuters, April 26, 2011, accessed March 26, 2016, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-sony-stoldendata-idUSTRE73P6WB20110426.
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non-authorized invasion of  the PlayStation Network and Qriocity service, also 
maintained by this company, had successfully obtained personal data from their 
associates, which included at least name, address, country, email address, date of  
birth, login information and network access password.16 Sony did not exclude the 
possibility of  data theft related to means of  payments, such as credit card number 
and expiration date. The company also announced emergency measures in response 
to the cyber-attack. In this regard, the company interrupted both services and hired 
an external consultancy to investigate the incident. Sony stated that it also took some 
technical measures to increase network infrastructure security focusing on the user’s 
personal data protection. In early May 2011, Sony resumed some of  PlayStation 
Network services and offered to its associates compensation that included free game 
downloading and thirty days of  differentiated services accessing.17
In the United States, lawyers filled several class actions demanding compensation 
for damages against Sony. After a brief  time, there was a consolidation of  all the 
judicial cases into one major class action, and Sony reached, in 2014, an agreement 
that avoided the final trial. That agreement predicted benefits to affected users 
that included financial compensation, free games and free offers to online services 
access depending on the type of  subscription that each affected individual had at the 
cyber-attack time. However, it all took place without Sony recognizing any corporate 
responsibility for the event. The media estimated that the amount paid reached 15 
million US dollars.18 The PlayStation Network case also caught the attention of  
several agencies in different countries, especially focusing on the effectiveness of  
Sony’s personal data security policies and some possible regulation improvements in 
this subject. Also, in 2011, the US House of  Representatives Energy and Commerce 
Committee questioned Sony about the leak, the company policy to protect data, 
privacy, and the consumer’s compensation plan.19 In the United Kingdom, an 
independent administrative agency responsible for regulating personal data protection 
fined Sony in 250 thousand pounds sterling.20 The Privacy Commissioner of  Canada, 
who is the official responsible for reporting the state of  privacy laws enforcement to 
Parliament, highlighted the global characteristic of  PlayStation Network’s leak case 
and the substantial extension of  damages to its customers worldwide. In the 2011 
annual report, he stated the need to regulate such kinds of  business environments.21
16 “Sony customer notification US States (excluding Puerto Rico and Massachusetts)”, Sony Computer 
Entertainment, 2011a, accessed March 26, 2016, http://us.playstation.com/news/consumeralerts.
17 “Some PlayStation Network and Qriocity services to be available this week”, Sony Computer Entertainment, 
2011b, accessed Mar. 26, 2016, https://blog.eu.playstation.com/2011/05/01/some-playstation-
network-andqriocity-services-to-be-available-this-week.
18 “Sony settles PSN hack lawsuit for $15 million”, ZDNET, July, 24, 2014, accessed April 5, 2016, 
http://www.zdnet.com/article/sony-settles-psn-hack-lawsuit-for-15-million.
19 “Sony’s Response to the U.S. House of  Representatives”, Sony Computer Entertainment, May 4, 
2011, accessed April 5, 2016, http://blog.us.playstation.com/2011/05/04/sonys-response-to-the-u-
s-house-ofrepresentatives.
20 Information Commissioner’s Office of  the United Kingdom, “Data protection rights: what the public 
want and what the public want from data protection authorities”, May, 2015, accessed April 5, 2016, 
https://ico.org.uk/media/about-the-ico/documents/1431717/data-protection-rights-what-the-
public-want-andwhat-the-public-want-from-data-protection-authorities.pdf.
21 Office of  the Privacy Commissioner of  Canada, “Annual Report of  the Office of  the Privacy 
Commissioner of  Canada on the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents 
Act for the period from January 1 to December 31, 2011”, June, 2012, accessed April 5, 2016, 
https://www.priv.gc.ca/information/ar/201112/2011_pipeda_e.asp.
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Another global scale personal and banking data leak case, which became 
notorious especially for causing personal embarrassment to victims, was the Ashley 
Madison social network breach. In this case, millions of  users had their contact data 
and means of  payment information published on several websites. Ashley Madison 
is a paid access social network in which married individuals seek to know people 
and to establish love affairs, obviously extramarital. The Canadian company Avid 
Life Media manages this Internet service. It stated to have more than 44 million 
registered users in 53 countries, in 2016. The company also stated to be the global 
leader on discreet meeting for married people. In Brazil, the Ashley Madison network 
has approximately three million registered users.22 In addition, in France, newspapers 
pointed that this network has between 330 thousand and 700 thousand users.23 
According to a report by Avid Life Media on its official website, in July 
2015 there was a cyber-attack to its systems and non-authorized access to Ashley 
Madison network user’s information.24 In addition, the company informed that it 
took security measures in its network to cease the attack and that it was working 
with governmental agencies to investigate the criminal offence. News reported 
that a hacker group named The Impact Team was responsible for Ashley Madison 
attack. That hacker group threatened to leak user’s personal data including names, 
real addresses, sexual fantasies and credit card numbers, if  Avid Life Media did not 
cease operating its social network.25 Avid Life Media’s subsequent official statements 
affirmed that this attack was not an act of  hacker activism, but a criminal one.26 In 
addition, it offered a 500 thousand Canadian dollars reward for information that 
could lead to author’s identification.27 The company’s president resigned a month 
after the attack.28 Afterwards, the hackers leaked some files of  Ashley Madison 
user’s personal and banking data in the web. Besides the identity of  married people 
seeking for extramarital relations, they revealed a large number of  that network’s 
female users were possibly nothing more than cybernetic robots. The network used 
these robots to simulate conversations.29/30 In addition, the disclosure of  user names 
22 “Ashley Madison reúne 3 milhões de brasileiros ‘para traição’; SP lidera”, TECHTUDO, July 22, 2015, 
accessed April 2, 2016, http://www.techtudo.com.br/noticias/noticia/2015/07/ashleymadison-
reune-3-milhoesde-brasileiros-para-traicao-sp-lidera.html.
23 “Ashley Madison leak could affect large number of  European users”, Deutsche Welle, August 24, 2015, 
accessed April 2, 2016, http://www.dw.com/en/ashley-madison-leak-could-affect-large-number-of-
europeanusers/a-18669182.
24 “Statement from Avid Life Media”, Avid Life Media, July 20, 2015, accessed April 9, 2016, 
http://media.ashleymadison.com/statement-from-avid-life-media-inc-july-20-1225pm.
25 “Extramarital affair website Ashley Madison has been hacked and attackers are threatening to leak data 
online”, Business Insider, July 20, 2015, accessed April 9, 2016, http://www.businessinsider.com/
cheatingaffair-website-ashley-madison-hacked-user-data-leaked-2015-7.
26 “Statement from Avid Life Media”, Avid Life Media, August 18, 2015, accessed April 9, 2016, 
http://media.ashleymadison.com/statement-from-avid-life-media-inc-august-18-2015.
27 “Statement from Avid Life Media”, Avid Life Media., August 24, 2015, accessed April 9, 2016, 
http://media.ashleymadison.com/statement-from-avid-life-media-august-24-2015.
28 “Statement from Avid Life Media”, Avid Life Media, August 28, 2015, accessed August 9, 2016, 
http://media.ashleymadison.com/statement-from-avid-life-media-august-28-2015.
29  “Ashley Madison condemns attack as experts say hacked database is real”, The Guardian, August 19, 2015, 
accessed April 9, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/aug/19/ashley-madisons-
hackedcustomer-files-posted-online-as-threatened-say-reports.
30 “Ashley Madison Code Shows More Women, and More Bots”, GIZMODO, August 31, 2015, accessed April 
9, 2016, http://gizmodo.com/ashley-madison-code-shows-more-women-and-more-bots-1727613924.
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caused some cases of  suicide.31 In the same way as in the PlayStation case, lawyers 
filled several class actions in Canada – the company’s headquarters country – and in 
the United States. In the first country, two law firms sued for 576 million dollars in 
compensation of  damages in behalf  of  Canadian network users.32
Both cases illustrate how companies with transnational commerce activity that 
manipulate sensitive personal and banking data with millions of  users in tens of  
countries are still vulnerable to leaks and to cyber-attacks. The websites that hold the 
consumer´s sensitive information, like their user’s credit card number or extramarital 
cases, have a duty to shield privacy rights ensured by the different jurisdictions in 
which they operate. In that sense, as highlighted in this article, the rapid evolution of  
information and communication technologies applied to online transactions cannot 
ignore the need of  implementing more security. It is clear that some of  that effective 
security will need to rely on the most advanced cryptography technical measures. 
In the same way, it will be necessary to redesign many of  the national legislations 
on consumer relations in order to adapt them to contemporary international 
e-commerce. They must consider the virtual environment in which those operations 
now take place and its inherent risks, create security obligations to companies and 
ensure compensation for victims of  personal and banking data leaks. In the next 
section, there is a description of  the current Brazilian legislation as well as some of  
the main proposals in discussion related to personal and banking data protection in 
transactions via Internet.
IV. The Consumer Protection Code and the Internet Legal 
Framework Statute33 for the Internet: e-commerce regulations 
in Brazilian law 
Brazil has a Consumer Protection Code, which rules on consumer relations in 
the country: Federal Statute 8,078 was signed into law on 11 September 1990. This 
statute conveys rules protecting the consumer, defining them as a physical (singular) 
person or legal entity that is the final user of  a purchase or use of  products or services, 
within a paid contract. The Consumer Protection Code deals with consumer-supplier 
relations in general and it rules about civil liability related to consumer damages 
caused by defects on products or services. Therefore, the Code also determine 
rules to deal with abusive commercial practices and illegal contractual clauses.34 In 
Brazil, these consumer protection rules affect commercial relations regardless of  the 
environment in which they occur.35 The Brazilian Federal Decree number 7,962 dated 
15 March 2013, created specific legal provisions concerning e-commerce contracting, 
31 “Toronto police investigating possible Ashley Madison suicides”, Fortune, August 24, 2015, accessed 
April 9, 2016, http://fortune.com/2015/08/24/ashley-madison-suicide.
32 “Ashley Madison faces huge class-action lawsuit”, BBC, August 23, 2015, accessed April 9, 2016, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-34032760.
33 Some authors translate this statute as “Brazilian Civil Rights Framework for the Interne” or “Civil 
Rights-based framework for the Internet”. Alexandre Veronese and Noemy Melo once used the 
expression “Internet Civil Legal Framework”: Alexandre Veronese and Noemy Melo, “O Projeto de 
Lei 5.276/2016 em contraste com o novo Regulamento Europeu (2016/679 UE)”, Revista de Direito 
Civil Contemporâneo 14 (2018): 71-99. Notwithstanding, the translation on this article is better, since the 
statute cover both civil (private) and public provisions.
34 Claudia Lima Marques, Confiança no comércio eletrônico e a proteção do consumidor (São Paulo: Editora 
Revista dos Tribunais, 2004).
35 Ricardo Luis Lorenzetti. Comércio eletrônico (São Paulo: Editora Revista dos Tribunais, 2004).
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in addition to the Code.36 The Decree provides standards to electronic consumer 
relations, demanding clear information about products, services and suppliers, ease 
of  access to the consumer help service and determines that the consumer has the 
right to cancel the contract within seven days, counting the day after the purchase 
(“the right of  regret”). Another important rule concerns the implementation of  
effective security measures for the treatment of  payment and the use of  consumer 
data by online shopping websites or broker systems (Article 3, subsection VII of  
the Decree). Thus, Brazilian law expressly determines that suppliers must adopt 
security systems to prevent the leaking of  the consumer’s personal and banking data. 
Non-compliance with such obligations may result in administrative penalties (Article 
56 of  the Consumer Protection Code) and lawsuits. There are some special civil 
procedural rules to protect the consumers from pleading in court (Articles 81 to 
90 of  the Code). It is also possible to fill in liability lawsuits and class actions to 
pursue against the damages raised from consumer relations (Articles 91 to 100 of  
the Code). Therefore, the Brazilian legal system provides for administrative penalties 
and damages compensation due to non-compliance of  supplier’s and their failure to 
adhere to the obligation of  safeguarding consumer personal and banking data. For 
this reason, Ellen Sartori considers that the country already has a legal framework 
to protect the consumer’s personal data, although she demands a more detailed and 
comprehensive legislation, similar to the European model.37
Furthermore, other Brazilian statutes seek to protect personal and banking data 
on the Internet and to refrain deliberate leaks. The Internet Legal Framework Statute 
– Brazilian Federal Statute number 12,965, dated of  23 April 2014 – partly regulates 
the Internet in the country, providing several rules to users, to companies and to 
government agencies. It expressly indicates the freedom of  speech as a foundation 
principle for the use of  Internet in Brazil (Article 2). It also states the protection of  
privacy and personal data as principles (Article 3, subsections II and III). Moreover, 
the Internet Legal Framework Statute establishes several rights to the users in the 
country in its Article 7. Subsection I grants the guarantee of  intimacy and privacy. 
Subsection III determines the inviolability and secrecy of  the user’s stored private 
communications. Also, subsection VII states the right of  non-disclosure to third 
parties of  users’ personal data, including their connection records and their records 
of  access to internet applications, unless with their express, free and informed 
consent or in accordance with the cases provided by law. In Article 8, the Internet 
Statute grants the guarantee to the right of  privacy and to freedom of  speech as a 
necessary condition for the full exercise of  the right to access to the Internet. It 
also asserts as unlawful the contractual clauses that violate the secrecy of  private 
communications. Article 8 also declares as void the contractual clauses that forbids 
the resolution of  disputes in Brazil. Regarding the protection of  personal data and 
the content of  private communications, as well as the storage and disclosure of  an 
Internet application’s connection and access logs, the Internet Statute provides, in 
Article 10, for protection of  intimacy, privacy, honor and image of  involved parties. 
It also determines that security and confidentiality measures and procedures shall 
36 Têmis Limberger, Jânia M. L. Saldanha and Carla A. S. Moraes, “Estado, cidadania e novas tecnologias: o 
comércio eletrônico e as alterações do Código de Defesa do Consumidor”, Revista de Direito do 
Consumidor 22 (2013): 261-82.
37 Ellen C. M. Sartori, “Privacidade e dados pessoais: a proteção contratual da personalidade do con-
sumidor na Internet”, Revista de Direito Civil Contemporâneo 9 (2016): 48-104.
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be informed in a clear manner, and must fill any regulation standards (Article 10, 
paragraph 4).
Whether an operation of  collection, storage or treatment of  personal data takes 
place in the Brazilian territory, Article 11 of  the Internet Statute states that there must 
be compliance to Brazilian law. When at least one of  the terminals is in Brazil, this 
rule of  jurisdiction also applies. In addition, the Brazilian jurisdiction applies if  the 
data was collected in the national territory. This even applies to activities carried out 
by a legal entity placed abroad, if  it offers services to the Brazilian public or at least 
one enterprise of  the same economic group is in Brazil (Article 11, paragraph 2). 
The Internet Statute also requires that Internet connection and application providers 
disclose information concerning compliance with Brazilian legislation (Article 11, 
paragraph 3) and it leaves for future regulation to specify oversight procedures 
(Article 11, paragraph 4). 
The Internet Statute prescribes administrative penalties for infringements of  
its rules, apart from other possible civil, criminal and administrative punishments 
(Article 12). Those penalties may be isolated or cumulative applied: a warning, fine, 
temporary suspension and prohibition to exercise activities of  storage and treatment 
of  logs or personal data. That Statute also provides that if  the fault comes from 
a foreign company, its subsidiary, branch, office or establishment in Brazil, will 
be jointly responsible for paying the fine (Article 12). Thus, the Internet Statute 
imposes obligations for Internet service providers and products suppliers to preserve 
confidentiality of  personal data, whether there is a consumer relation and whether 
the legal entity is based in Brazil, as long as it offers its services in the country. It also 
creates its own penalty system, which can be cumulatively applied with sanctions 
from the Consumer Protection Code and other applicable civil liabilities and criminal 
sanctions.
The Brazilian legislation also establishes criminal punishments to personal data 
leaks on the Internet, as stated in Brazilian Federal Statute No. 12,737, dated 30 
November 2012, which became known as “Carolina Dieckmann Act” in remembrance 
of  a Brazilian actress who was victim of  blackmail and leakage of  intimate 
photographs on the Internet. That case had considerable impact in Brazilian media.38 
This Statute included in the Brazilian Criminal Code the crime of  “computing device 
invasion” (Article 154-A), which can impose the punishment of  imprisonment from 
three months to one year combined with a fine. It also imposes the same punishment 
on whoever “produces, offers, sells or disseminates a device or computer program” 
for that purpose (Article 154-A, paragraph 1). However, Brazilian law does not 
consider the act of  invading a computing device without the intent of  obtaining, 
adulterating or destroying data or gaining illicit advantages as a crime. The penalty 
shall be increased if  an invasion causes economic losses (Article 154-A, paragraph 2). 
The penalty shall also be increased if  the captured data is covered by confidentiality 
or relates to private electronic communications, trade or industrial secrets, or the 
invasion results in remote control of  the device under attack. In such cases, the 
penalty shall be imprisonment from six months to two years combined with a fine 
if  the conduct is not considered a more serious crime (Article 154-A, paragraph 
3). The penalty shall also be increased if  there is disclosure, commercialisation or 
38 “Carolina Dieckmann prestará depoimento sobre publicação de fotos íntimas”, Folha de São Paulo, May 6, 
2012, accessed March 26, 2016, http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/ilustrada/1086411-carolina-die-
ckmann-prestaradepoimento-sobre-publicacao-de-fotos-intimas.shtml.
® UNIO - EU LAW JOURNAL Vol. 4, No. 2, July 2018
74 Alexandre Veronese & Marcelo Cunha
transmission of  obtained data to third parties (Article 154-A, paragraph 4) or the 
victim is one of  the listed authorities in Article 154-A, paragraph 5. The “Carolina 
Dieckmann Act” also amended Article 298 of  the Brazilian Criminal Code, which 
describes the crime of  “forgery of  private documents” in order to include credit and 
debit cards within the concept of  private documents, thus criminalizing the use of  
leaked banking data. 
It is important to show that Brazilian law seeks to establish legal provisions 
to protect the confidentiality of  personal and banking data in an ever-changing 
technological environment. The expansion of  types of  means of  payment in 
electronic transactions brokered by telecommunications devices and managed by 
non-financial institutions is a spreading phenomenon across different jurisdictions 
and it demanded the creation of  specific legal rules in Brazil. Articles 6 to 15 of  
the Federal Statute No. 12,865, dated 9 October 2013, allowed telecommunications 
companies to offer payment services through mobile phones as a way of  promoting 
financial inclusion policies. That Statute also demands the protection of  personal 
data in the operation.
The technological evolution enables social inclusion through information and 
communication technologies, but it brings new challenges for companies, to States 
and to societies. There are many technical issues as, for example, the burden of  
developing communication structures to support the expansion of  e-commerce.39 
On the other hand, sales of  virtual services and products bring other challenges, 
since the delivery and use of  the acquired products or services are entirely provided 
by electronic means.40 However, the most relevant and urgent current issue relates 
to the security of  personal and banking information. This central issue appears to 
be manifold as we shall consider the escalation of  virtual financial operations and 
the growing number of  actors, systems and devices related to online transactions. 
In the Brazilian case, there are some legal rules that may be useful on that matter. 
However, effective consumer protection relates not only to the existence of  
legal provisions. It relies completely on the social use by all the parties involved. 
Therefore, the legal principles such as those provided by the Consumer Protection 
Code and the Internet Legal Framework Statute will only be regarded as legal means 
of  protection when the different social actors to guide their relations effectively use 
them. Nevertheless, it seems clear that those statutes are not enough to generate 
a comprehensive normative set and Brazil still requires a specific legislation for 
personal data protection. The standards must be similar to those that are in place in 
Europe through Directive 2000/31/EC (electronic commerce) and Directive 95/46/
EC (personal data protection) replaced by Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (General Data 
Protection Regulation).41
The main objective of  this article is to demonstrate that collection of  banking 
data into automated systems managed by corporate conglomerates or corporations 
increase the risk of  massive leaks. Several countries, including Brazil, have limited 
means of  repression against those risks. On the other hand, the preventive control 
of  those integrated purchasing systems is also complex. An effective control system 
39 Allain Rallet, “Commerce electronique ou electronisation du commerce?”, Réseaux 106 (2001): 17-72.
40  Fabrice Lequeux and Allain Rallet, “Un Internet peut en cacher um autre: vers l’avènement des marchés du 
multimédia en ligne”, Réseaux 124 (2004): 207-44.
41 Laura Schertel Mendes and Danilo Doneda, “Marco jurídico para a cidadania digital: uma análise do 
Projeto de Lei 5.276/2016”, Revista de Direito Civil Contemporâneo 9 (2016): 35-48.
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would rely upon transnational cooperation systems for its proper operation. It is true 
that national banking systems have a cooperative regime, which is able to provide 
confidence in international trade. However, even systems as SWIFT are under 
scrutiny of  national authorities of  personal data protection due to risks related to 
money laundering and terrorism.42 In summary, the debate on the vertical integration 
of  e-commerce structures is still incipient and it has not yet focused on issues related 
to the aggregation of  transaction systems to the supply systems. In general, the 
current academic literature still addresses whether it is appropriate to integrate the 
offer of  digital content to the means of  provision, an issue known as net neutrality.43 
It is evident that the future regulatory risks relate to the vertical and international 
integration of  e-commerce, as to say, the constitution of  corporate conglomerates 
that aggregates the sale of  goods and services with the payment systems.
V. Conclusion
This paper described a contemporary problem related to e-commerce: the 
integration between automated commercial transaction systems and the supply of  
goods and services. At first, it mentioned the quantitative expansion of  e-commerce 
and its relation to the automatization of  trade. It presented a typology of  the evolution 
of  transaction systems to highlight the increased risks of  leaks in concentrated 
systems. It cited two international leak cases – Sony PlayStation and Ashley Madison 
– to demonstrate the potential of  massive and extensive damages that may happen 
due to the large gathering of  consumer’s banking data in integrated purchasing 
systems. This exposition highlighted that an a posteriori legal defense against these 
violations is very complicated and that different countries have asymmetric means 
of  defense against those violations. The study of  Brazilian Law demonstrates that its 
contemporary legislation has some norms that grant preventive protection and seek 
to pursue the repression of  violations within its national jurisdiction. Nevertheless, 
such legal prescriptions are disperse in many different legal statutes and there are no 
rules providing for international cooperation and for the structuring of  enforcing 
and protection measures. 
To wrap up, this article points at two debates that must happen in Brazil. The 
first one is the establishment of  a legal framework for personal data protection, 
which must integrate itself  with the existing legal norms. It also must encompass an 
international cooperation system in accordance with European Law. The second one 
is the debate on risks of  vertical integration between the means of  transaction and the 
supply of  goods and services via e-commerce, especially due to internationalization 
of  corporations. Those questions were not fully addressed by the Brazilian National 
Congress on the approval of  the Internet Legal Framework Statute, even though its 
explanatory memorandum mentioned this regulatory debate.
In fact, the use of  payment systems in new business models with the integration 
between Internet access provision services and the financial sector is not a commercial 
option in Brazil yet. However, any future debate on the integration of  e-commerce 
operations needs to face the cardinal issue of  personal data protection. Such future 
42 Anthony Amicelle, “The great (data) bank robbery: terrorist finance tracking program and the 
SWIFT affair”, Research Questions 36 (2011), accessed April 9, 2016, http://www.sciencespo.fr/ceri/
en/content/great-data-bankrobbery-terrorist-finance-tracking-program-and-swift-affair.
43 Nicolas Curien and Winston Maxwell, La neutralité d’Internet (Paris: La Découverte, 2011).
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debate must also focus on the problem of  the competition protection, taking into 
account the international scenario. We can say that the debate cannot only take the 
Brazilian law perspective or not only just one national law point of  view. It also 
requires the appreciation of  the legal, economic and social frameworks of  many 
different countries that have already held these discussions, in order to explore the 
possibility of  legal cooperation as a way to mitigate the limits of  local jurisdiction in 
disputes with large transnational companies. 
What was the consequence of  the Edward Snowden disclosure case in 2013? 
It was the growing concern from managers and technicians in the European Union 
about insufficient protection of  the cooperation agreements of  this social and 
economic bloc in relation to the United States of  America. Those concerns led to 
a review of  all European Union legislation about personal data protection. Is has 
also served to expand the interest in increasing enforcement by several national 
authorities. It was for this reason that Liane Colonna depicted Europeans’ reaction 
of  immediate suspicion to the interaction between great companies of  the United 
States of  America and the government of  that country and its reflection in European 
Union law on personal data protection.44 From another perspective, Juhi Tariq stated 
his opinion that United States companies should be concerned about the changing 
panorama due to the Edward Snowden disclosure case.45 With regard to Brazil, this 
major international affair seems not to have caught systematic attention from national 
legislators and regulators, although Alessandro Molon indicates that the approval 
of  the Internet Legal Framework Statute would have been a consequence of  this 
event51. In short, there is demand for regulatory debate on the dimensioning of  
banking and personal data national protection – through integrated legislation – to 
measure risks and potentialities of  vertical integration processes that, nevertheless, 
are ongoing around the world in different markets. Yet, this debate must consider 
administrative and judicial cooperation as a focal point for the effectiveness of  
contemporary means of  protection.
44 Liane Colonna, “PRISM and the European Union’s data protection directive”, The John Marshall Journal of  
Information Technology & Privacy Law 30 (2013): 227-51, http://repository.jmls.edu/jitpl/vol30/iss2/1/.
45  Juhi Tariq, “The NSA’s PRISM program and the new EU privacy regulation: why US companies with a 
presence in the EU could be in trouble”, American University Business Law Review 3 (2014): 371-82. 
51 Alessandro Molon, “A legislação e a internet: ideais, desafios e avanços com o Marco Civil da 
Internet”, Cadernos Adenauer 16 (2015): 107.
